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The	role	of	sacrality	in	British	state-supported
Holocaust	remembrance
British	Holocaust	remembrance	has	dramatically	grown	in	prominence	since	the	1990s.	David
Tollerton	discusses	the	changing	ways	in	which	public	Holocaust	memory	has	intersected	with	the
politics	of	New	Labour	and	Conservative-led	governments.
When	David	Cameron	launched	his	Prime	Minister’s	Holocaust	Commission	in	2014,	he	declared
that	its	mission	to	preserve	public	memory	of	the	murder	of	six	million	European	Jews	was	‘a
sacred	task’.	The	commission’s	most	high-profile	recommendation,	the	construction	of	a	new
memorial	and	learning	centre	next	to	the	Houses	of	Parliament,	was	later	described	by	Theresa	May	as	‘a	sacred
national	mission’,	while	Chief	Rabbi	Ephraim	Mirvis	has	spoken	of	creating	‘a	sacred	space	for	reflection’.	In	my
new	book,	I	argue	that	alongside	such	verbal	appeals	to	sacrality,	British	state-supported	Holocaust	remembrance
has	also	taken	on	various	functional	manifestations	of	sacrality.	This	includes	the	ritual	forms	of	Holocaust
Memorial	Day	events,	school	visits	to	Auschwitz	as	reconfigured	pilgrimage,	and	affirmations	that	the	Holocaust	is	a
radically	unique	event	which	makes	universal	and	timeless	demands	on	public	memory.	The	executive	summary	of
Britain’s	Promise	to	Remember,	the	2015	report	published	by	Cameron’s	commission,	remarked	that	‘the	Holocaust
was	unprecedented	and	should	never	be	seen	as	equivalent	to	other	genocides’,	and	that	the	commission’s
mission	was	to	articulate	‘lessons	that	will	resonate	with	people	of	all	faiths,	from	all	lands,	for	all	times’.
The	presence	of	such	perceived	sacrality	should	not	itself	be	an	object	of	automatic	criticism,	as	the	historical
narratives	and	core	value-building	of	a	society	are	always	going	to	be	intimately	bound	up	with	feelings	of
sacredness.	But	there	is	a	risk	that,	amidst	such	sacred	fervour	to	remember,	the	political	dimensions	of	these
commemorative	initiatives	are	too	easily	obscured.
After	decades	of	comparative	indifference,	the	British	state’s	enthusiasm	for	Holocaust	remembrance	became
particularly	apparent	during	the	early	years	of	New	Labour	rule.	The	Labour	MP	Andrew	Dismore	suggested	in
parliament	that	a	new	memorial	day	would	contribute	to	the	‘building	blocks	of	a	civilised	society’,	reflective	of	what
‘the	New	Labour	government	are	committed	to	building’.	The	idea	was	enthusiastically	endorsed	by	Tony	Blair	and
his	ministers.	At	this	time,	Holocaust	remembrance	had	a	notably	pro-European	orientation,	with	Dismore	speaking
of	coordinating	Holocaust	Memorial	Day	across	the	European	Union	and	Blair,	addressing	the	first	national
ceremony	in	January	2001,	referring	to	‘a	turning	point	in	European	and	human	history’	and	‘the	reconstruction	of
our	continent	founded	on	the	values	of	democracy,	liberty,	equality,	opportunity’.
With	the	change	of	government	in	2010,	Cameron	continued	to	support	Holocaust	remembrance,	further
strengthening	the	place	of	Holocaust	education	in	the	national	curriculum,	appointing	a	UK	Special	Envoy	for	Post-
Holocaust	Issues,	and	establishing	his	new	Holocaust	commission.	But	the	idea	of	positioning	Holocaust	memory	in
a	narrative	of	post-war	European	rebirth	and	integration	fell	by	the	wayside.	Britain’s	Promise	to	Remember	entirely
avoids	mention	of	the	EU,	instead	announcing	on	its	first	page	that	‘ensuring	that	the	memory	and	the	lessons	of
the	Holocaust	are	never	forgotten	lies	at	the	heart	of	Britain’s	values	as	a	nation’	and	that	‘in	commemorating	the
Holocaust,	Britain	remembers	the	way	it	proudly	stood	up	to	Hitler’.	When	Victoria	Tower	Gardens	was	announced
as	the	site	for	the	new	memorial	and	learning	centre,	the	government	press	release	title	proclaimed	that	it	would
‘stand	beside	Parliament	as	permanent	statement	of	our	British	values’.	Alongside	such	nationalistic	framing,	the
alignment	of	state-supported	Holocaust	remembrance	with	‘British	values’	in	both	political	rhetoric	and	education
policy	is	also	an	uncomfortable	development	given	the	term’s	roots	in	controversial	and	divisive	securitisation
policies.
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One	of	the	reasons	that	the	sacralisation	of	Holocaust	remembrance	can	seem	to	mask	the	politics	of	memory	is
that	commemorative	initiatives	overwhelmingly	enjoy	cross-party	support.	Party	affiliations	are	largely	laid	aside
when	parliamentarians	speak	at	the	annual	Holocaust	Memorial	Day	debates	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	no
major	government	initiative	since	the	1990s	has	faced	serious	contestation	from	opposition	parties.	But	beneath	the
smooth	surface	there	have	been	occasional	disruptions.	In	2007,	Cameron	briefly	caused	furore	by	referring	to
state-funded	‘Lessons	from	Auschwitz’	school	visits	to	Poland	as	a	‘gimmick’,	but	more	sustained	tension	emerged
during	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	period	as	leader	of	the	Labour	Party.	Despite	the	initiative	starting	prior	to	his	tenure,	on
several	occasions	organisers	of	the	new	London	memorial	and	learning	centre	linked	the	project	to	his	association
with	antisemitism	debates,	and	when	recalling	his	experience	of	accompanying	a	‘Lessons	from	Auschwitz’	trip,
Jeremy	Hunt	appeared	to	suggest	that	Corbyn	threatened	a	repeat	of	the	Holocaust.	‘When	I	went	to	Auschwitz’,
the	Health	Secretary	remarked	in	July	2019,	‘I	rather	complacently	said	to	myself,	“thank	goodness	we	don’t	have	to
worry	about	that	kind	of	thing	happening	in	the	UK”	and	now	I	find	myself	faced	with	the	leader	of	the	Labour	Party
who	has	opened	the	door	to	antisemitism	in	a	way	that	is	truly	frightening’.
But	in	recent	times,	perhaps	the	most	conspicuous	political	tension	amidst	Holocaust	remembrance	has	not	been
between	parties,	but	between	central	and	local	government.	Plans	for	a	new	memorial	and	learning	centre	next	to
the	Houses	of	Parliament	have	proven	controversial	with	a	range	of	local	activists	and	heritage	organisations,	and
in	the	summer	of	2019	it	became	apparent	that	Westminster	City	Council	was	likely	to	reject	planning	permission.	It
duly	did	so	in	February	2020,	but	by	this	point	ministers	were	conscious	that	a	high-profile	project	was	heading	into
trouble	and	so	adjusted	the	process	such	that	the	final	decision	would	be	made	at	a	national	level	(i.e.	by	central
government	itself).	The	story	is	illustrative	of	the	extent	to	which	the	project,	much	like	New	Labour’s	establishment
of	Holocaust	Memorial	Day	before	it,	has	been	very	much	a	top-down	initiative.	In	the	case	of	the	new	memorial
and	learning	centre,	the	idea	was	literally	the	product	of	Cameron’s	own	imagination,	purportedly	inspired	by
personal	visits	to	memorial	sites	in	Berlin	or	–	depending	on	which	of	his	accounts	you	follow	–	Jerusalem.
Boris	Johnson,	since	becoming	Prime	Minister	in	2019,	has	voiced	similar	support	for	state-supported	Holocaust
remembrance	and	it	seems	likely	that	its	narratives	will	follow	the	same	trajectory	they	have	since	Cameron
established	his	commission	in	2014.	Certainly,	it	is	very	improbable	that	Holocaust	remembrance	will	be	allowed	to
intersect	with	interrogating	racial	violence	in	Britain’s	own	history	–	something	several	commentators	have
suggested	would	be	beneficial	–	given	a	context	in	which	Johnson	used	his	first	speech	outside	10	Downing	Street
to	claim	that	‘no	one	in	the	last	few	centuries	has	succeeded	in	betting	against	the	pluck	and	nerve	and	ambition	of
this	country’	and	that,	post-Brexit,	the	task	is	to	‘recover	our	natural	and	historic	role’.
If	the	new	memorial	and	learning	centre	will	indeed	be	‘a	sacred	space	for	reflection’	when	it	is	finished	sometime	in
the	2020s,	then	it	will	be	a	space	heavy	with	political	context	alongside	such	sacrality.	This	should	not	in	itself	be	a
surprise.	As	James	Young	remarked,	‘memory	is	never	shaped	in	a	vacuum;	the	motives	of	memory	are	never
pure’.	But	in	contemporary	Britain,	the	perceptions	of	sacredness	that	surround	the	discourses	and	practices	of
state-supported	Holocaust	remembrance	can	often	obscure	this	reality.	If,	as	Cameron’s	commission	wanted	to
ensure,	public	awareness	of	the	Holocaust	is	long-lasting,	it	is	a	self-critical	and	context-conscious	form	of	memory
that	should	be	sought	after.
____________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	latest	book,	Holocaust	Memory	and	Britain’s	Religious-Secular	Landscape:
Politics,	Sacrality,	and	Diversity	(Routledge,	2020).
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